^*^BP»)irJW*pw"w^^*«"(Piii'"«""*iw'^""'W«>P^*»"^ ^^" w^wi N iMmijt*~mmi^^m**mmmmn*fmmmmmi**^mmmimn One aspect of a political system's performance that has received fairly wide attention is the degree to which the system is able to maintain a The event counts for turmoil and revolution were examined and found to be highly skewed. This skewness was reduced by subjecting both measures to a log (X + 1) transformat^ jn, which resulted in measures with a lower bound of zero, which corresponded to the conriplete absence of turmoil and revolutionary events respectively. We might note that this skewness, at least in part, reflects differential levels of re-2 porting in the New York Times for the various European nations, and that the logarithmic transformation counteracts this reporting bias in event data.
The number of deaths resulting from r.omestic conflict was also found to be a h'ghly skewed measure of the intensity of internal instability. Accordingly, this measure was subjected to a log (X + 10) transformamation, which resulted in an intensity measure with a lower bound oi 
suggest that a part of the skewness of ueai.' s from domestic conflict resulted from differential levels of newspaper reporting. In this case, however, it is likely that rather exact death tolls were available for nations for which the New York Times provided extensive coverage, while exaggerated body counts were more likely where the newspaper coverage was much less intense. The log transformation also provided sonnte reduction of this bias for the deaths from domestic conflict measure. Europe where low numbers of turmoil and revolutionary events may be a function of low reporting, '■he numbers of deaths reported are not only very high, but are gi 'en in numbers rounded off to the nearest thousand, a characteristic of gross, estimated, and often exaggei.ted body counts.
.Levels of both turmoil and revolutionary activity were computed by multiplying the transformed event data for each category by the intensity weighting factor, that is, the transformed death tolls. Since the transformations in both cafes adjusted for the expected direction of reporting biases, and those biases were in opposite directions, combining the two measures in a multiplicative manner further offset the effects of these biases. The composite measures of the levels of turmoil and revolution, then, are intended to tap two Q?mensi ms of instability: the number of destabilizing activities of each typ*? that a nation experiences, as well as the relative scope and severity of those actions.
A word of caution is needed, however, concerning the interpretability id ■f-i
of these composite measures. If event data had been used without being weighted by an intensity factor, the forecasts that would have been generated could have been retransformed so that they constituted predictions about the numbers of riots, demonstrations, and armed attacks expected in the vaiious European nations during the 1980'8.
Analyses of levels of turmoil and revolution, however, cannot be similarly interpreted. Forecasts generated on the basis of these composite measures must be interpreted in a relative s^nse «ince they reflect the levels of instability expected for a nation relative to the other European nations. In short, although these scores have interval properties and can be analyzed using po verful parametric statistical techniques, there are no observable occurrences in the world that correspond exactly to any given unit of turmoil or revolution. Thus, the measures should be interpreted as ordinal and i.sed for comparing the levels of instability among the various European na .ions. In forecasting instability from these composite measures, the most appropriate kind of output would be rankings of the European nations. Rankings suggest comparative levels of expfted instability and in no way imply expected absolute event counts. Table 1 presented rankirgs of the European nations on the composite measures of the levels of turmoil and revolution for t^e period 1948-19^5. During that time span, these measures were n jarly uncorrelated with each other, suggesting that our characterh-.atioi of them as distinct aspects of internal instability is consistent with the observations generated by our measuring instruments. We suggest that this near-zero correlation, coupled with previously cited theoretical and empirical evidence of the distinctiveness of these two dimensions of internal instabil.l^ validates the use of such measuring instruments.
That is, we regard measuring inEtruments as valid to the extent that 3 If the data we have generated do not evidence obvious signs of invalidity, they may be used to examine internal instability and therefore to generate a longranje forecasting model of internal instability.
Cronbach and Meehl note that. "To make clear the meaning of a concept is to set forth the laws--r elationship ; --within which It occurs " so that validation is the examination of these relationships. 
IV. PREDICTORS OF Il'TERNAL INSTABILITY
A. OTHER CENTRAL ENVIRONMENTAL DESCRIPTORS
Previous Levels of Internal Instability
Nearly all empirical research into the causes of internal mstability in nations has founa that previous levels of instability are strongly linked to the present lev.?l of internal instability. 1 Rubin, in fact, has found that past levels of domestic conflict are the dominant predictors of internal instability at any given point in time.
Obviously one can see that turmoil >r revolutionary activity which began in one time perird and continues into the next time frame under analysis produces a strong relationship between instability in the two time frames. Probablv more significant, however, is the pressure at the present time that results from arguments that justify internal instability on the basis of i^ past 3 success.
That is, if a nation has a history of high levels of in.' tability which has brought changes in governmental policies and practices, or ir the governmental structure itself, that history of success provides an impetus for utiliziiv turmoil or revolution to solve present problems or to relieve present dissatisfactions. In short, successful use of destabilizing activities reinforces the tendencies for their use.
Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices": Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations"; Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations"; and others.
Theodo.-e Rubin, "Summary: Environmental Information Service" (Santa Barhara, Calif.: TEMPO), p. xv.
T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel. 
Economic Interdependence
We suggest that nations that are highly dependent upon the foreign sector for a large proportion of their gross national product are in a more economically precarious position than those not so dependent. This is especially true of any nation whose dependence is upon only one or a few foreign powers, because changes in the foreign government's policies that severely reduce or stop the flow of trade ca^ seriously affect the dependent nation's economy.
That is, when the economic base of a nation can be vr ry serious^ disrupted by the activities of a single foreign power, or small group of foreign powers, that nation's economy has relatively low resiliency. To the extent that such dependence is recognized by the nation in question, and to the extent that the nation's citizens consequently feel economic insecurity.
Cronbach and Meehl, "Construct Validity in Psychological Tests"; Gurr, Politimetrics; and Caporaso, "Theory and Method in the Study of International Organizations. "
Gurr, \7hy Men Rebel. interdependent with the foreign sector and that interdependence can be concentrated among a few nations; but if the nation's economy is very large and very strong, such a situation does not put the nation in such a perilous economic situation.
By utilizing the economic power component of the national power base descriptor, we hypothesize that the relationship between internal instability and economic interdependence is inversely mediated by the value of the nation's economic power base. Moreover, we believe that a nation's power base, both the economic and military components, directly affect the nation's level of internal instability. Gurr, among others, has found that a government's ability to suppress instability varies inversely with the level 01 instability experienced by that nation. Specifically, he finds that as the relative size of the regime's military forces and internal security forces increases, the level of ob served instability in that nation decreases. We regard a regime's capacity to suppress internal instability best measured by the level of its military power base within the context of this interactive forecasting model. The work of Gurr and other students of internal instability, then, leads us to hypothesize that the levels of turmoil and revolution in a nation vary inversely with the value of its military power base.
Seve^^l theorists have also argued that the extent of a nation's economic development also affects its level of internal instability. Gurr specifically finds that instability is sensitive to the level of a nation's GNP, its GNP growth rate, the level of energy consumpfon per capita la the country, the extent to which its economy provides technical and T.R. Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices. "
---* vmmimmw*" "i »•PIPTOP^!WW"T-'""^»»"WIP^^WWtW»iiuPBm"iiiPi ^" '' l »™<<WW^"WI»»^«Pl»iPP«f*'^«»W"^WW*^i"rwipiP«'lP".i»l"iiw^B» 7 professional jobs, and the level of investment in the nation's economy.
Taylor has found that the probability of revolutionary activity decreases g with greater GNP per capita, and with greater rates 01 growth in GNP.
The Feierabends have also found that a positive rate of chr.nge in income 9 is correlated w ; th irrreasing internal stability.
This set of variables is best represented by the economic power base descriptor within the context of our integrated forecasting model. As measures of the levil of economic development, these variables are usually highly correlated, and are used here as components of a nation's economic power base. Accordingly, we hypothesize that high values of a nation's economic power base will be related to low levels of internal instability in the nation, and vice versa.
International Alignment
It has been suggested that instability is related to the degree to which a nation is aligned with major powers. Since nations that are highly aligned with major powers are given added legitimacy by virtue of that alignment, and since, to some extent at least, their military forces are freed from external defense requirements for use in suppressing internal 7 Ibid. 
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■■MM mm* mv*r< " 11 "■ mm instability, we expect nations so aligned to evidence lower leve's of observed instability than would otherwise be expected. Again, however, the power oaae at a nation's disposal is expected to modify this relationship; nations which have the economic and military resources to deal with instability on theii. own need not depend upon alignment with major powers as in aid in suppressing destabilizing activities. In short, we expect nations that are more aligned with major powers to show fewer signs of instability than would otherwise be expected, except when those nations have the resources to suppress that instability without the assistance of alignments.
Specifically, analysis of the international alignment descriptor will yield forecasts of the extent to which nations are aligned with major powers. We hypothesize, then, that internal instability varies inversely with the extent of a nation's major power alignment, and tliat this relationship is mediated inversely by the summed value of a nation's economic and military power bases.
B. EXOGENOUS PREDICTORS OF INTERNAL INSTABILITY
In addition to the previously mentioned predictors of internal instability that are, themselves, descriptors of interest here, several predictors of instability will be examined that are exogenous, or outside, the inte- It can be viewed as one way to adapt to perceived political pressures short of losing formal control of the government. Minor transfers of power are viewed here as similar to major transfers in that they both measure the degree to which a government exhibits long-term flexibility and long-term legitimacy. As was the case with negative government sanctions, major and minor power transfers can be either responses to or causes of internal political instability. Again, however, we shall be concentrating our efforts on forecasting internal instability and shall view major and minor regular power transfers as predictors of instability.
Just as negative government sanctions were not expected to have instantaneous impacts on instability, regular power transfers are not viewed as simultaneous causes of internal instability. That is, we do not regard the occurrence of a regular power transfer, or a series of regular power transfers, as predicting relatively low levels of internal instability in the subsequent period. Rather, we view the history of power transfers in a nation as relevant to the forecasting of internal instability. We hypothesize that nations with histories of regular, rather than irregular, power transfers view their governments as relatively more legitimate and are, accordingly, less susceptible to high levels of internal instability. Regular power transfers, then, fit into the category of a long-lagged predictor of internal instability.
14 Ibid. . pp. 85-86.
Population
Taylor suggests that the size of a nation is an important factor in accounting for its level of internal political disturbance. His hypothesis is that a state with more people has a greater probability of a high level of instability than does one with fewer people simply because there are more individuals who may ootentially become involved in destabilizing activities. The p/eser.t population of the nations examined in this study ranges from about two to three hundred thousand in Iceland and Luxembourg to more than 230 million in the Soviet Union.
Such wide variation permits us to consider population as a potentially useful predictor of internal instability in the context of Eastern and Western Europe.
In a very strict sense, population is not i long-lagged predictor of internal instability, but rather a variable that affects the level of instability more-or-less instantaneously. That is, the population of a nation at a given year determines the potential number of individuals in that nation who may participate in destabilizing activity. We maintain that a nation is likely to experience high levels of instability if it is presently very large, not because it was very large fifteen years ago. More practically, however, population size is a highly autocorrelated time series. That is, population size at one year can strongly predict populatim size at a later year. In part, of course, this is due to the fact that the size of a nation's population, aside from changes due to immigration and emigration, is a function of its
15
Charles L. Taylor, "Political Development and Civil Disorder," (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the /merican Political Science Association, September 1969), p. 7.
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i i n^apwpvmMaHannNVpw^TC^MWip^» population growth rate and the previous size of its population. Although population does not strictly fit into our category of long-lagged exogenous predictors, the characteristics of this measure permit it to be ised as such.
As with the components of turmoil and revolution, population was found to be a highly skewed measure. Accordingly, it was also subjected to a log (X+l) transformation. Specifically, then, we hypothesize that this transformed measure of population size is pos ; tively linked to levels of turmoil and revolution. 
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